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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DeBRY AND HILTON TRAVEL
SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiff and
llant,
Appell
Case No. 14335

v.
CAPITOL INTERNATIONAL
AIRWAYS, INC.,
Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Appellant DeBry and Hilton Travel Services, Inc. (hereinafter termed "Appellant") is a travel agent - broker. Defendant-Respondent Capitol International Airways, Inc.,
(hereinafter termed "Respondent") is a charter airline. Appellant claims a five per cent (5%)
brokerage commission pursuant to an oral brokerage contract between Appellant and
Respondent in connection with the sale of over $1,500,000 of charter flights procured and
sold by Appellant for Respondent, which brokerage commission Respondent has refused
to pay.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
Following a non-jury trial based primarily upon a stipulation of the parties, the trial court
entered judgment in favor of Respondent and against Appellant, no cause of action, and
awarded Respondent its costs.
Respondent filed a Counterclaim which was withdrawn during the trial.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and entry of a judgment in its favor and against
Respondent for the sum of $78,401.48, and Appellant's costs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant is a corporation generally engaged in the sale and promotion of travel. Such
activities involve the negotiation and sale of charter flights and the marketing of vacation
tours generally, including the sale of airplane tickets, hotel reservations and the like. From
time to time, Appellant sells air transportation to large groups. Instead of buying individual
airplane tickets, such large groups (or group tour operators) often charter an entire airplane.
(R. 813; Tr. 15)
Respondent is a charter airline. This means that Respondent does not sell individual tickets.
Respondent only sells charter flights to qualified or charterworthy groups. (R. 808)
In order to solicit such charter business, Respondent advertises extensively to travel agents.
From 1967-1974 Respondent spent approximately $2,793,600 for advertisements in travel
agent trade journals and in direct mailings to travel agents. (R. 809) In addition to these
published advertisements, Respondent has a staff of approximately 50-60 full time sales
personnel. (R. 809)
The purpose of the advertising and sales effort of Respondent is to get travel agents to
utilize Respondent's services or to go to customers and try to get them to form charter groups
to be transported on Respondent's airplanes. (R. 809) The travel agent is not the purchaser of
the charter flight. Customarily, the travel agent negotiates the contract between the airline
and the travel group. The travel agent acts in the capacity of a broker or middleman. (R. 813;
Tr. 15, 16)
The travel agent's only compensation for selling such charter flights is a commission of 5%
of the charter paid directly by the airline to the travel agent. This 5% commission is standard
and customary throughout the air charter industry. (R. 809, 810; Tr. 21)
The negotiation of a charter flight takes place in various stages. The travel agent first screens
the potential charter user to determine whether the user is charterworthy and whether the
needs and requirements of the charter user such as destination, number of people, etc., can
be met(R. 808; Tr. 17) The travel agent next tries to match the needs of the charter user with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a particular charter airline, i.e., size of the airplane, authority of the airline to fly to a particular
destination and otherwise plans and schedules the ground packages, including hotels, transportation and the like. The travel agent next circulates the charter user's requirements to those
air carriers which are qualified and interested in the tour. The circulation of the charter user's
requirements to various airlines is frequently done orally. (Tr. 18) A charter airline on occasion
receives requests from several travel agents for the same flights. (R. 810) From the time of the
initial contact by the charter user until bids on the particular flights are received by the travel
agent, a substantial period of up to four months may elapse. The actual charter departure
date may be as much as a year following the initial contact between the travel agent and
charter user. (Tr. 21)
One of the most critical negotiations undertaken by the travel agent concerns deposits that
are required by the airline to charter the airplanes. These deposits may equal 10% of the
charter price and part of the travel agent's function is to negotiate the amount of such deposits
to comply with the requirements of the particular airline and the ability of the charter user to
pay such deposits. (Tr. 20)
In February of 1973, Appellant became acquainted with Prestige Vacations, a group tour
operator (charter user) (hereinafter termed "Prestige"). Prestige requested Appellant to find
and arrange a series of charter flights. (R. 816, 819, 825) According to the instructions of
Prestige and according to the custom of the industry, Appellant sought bids from several
different airlines, including Respondent. (R. 810) At the time Appellant introduced Prestige
to Respondent, Respondent had never even heard of Prestige. (Ex. P-2, P-3)
Following this introduction, Appellant and Respondent had a conversation about the
Prestige account. The substance of that conversation was a request by Appellant for Respondent to bid on the Prestige flights.(R. 816; Tr. 34)Respondent agreed to quote on the Prestige
flights and to pay a 5% commission to Appellant if the flights were sold and if Prestige would
sign a document termed a "Charter Agency Agreement" (Ex. D-51), making Appellant the
agent of record. (R. 819, 825)
Sometime thereafter Appellant had other conversations with Respondent. Appellant
expressed concern about what would happen if Prestige went behind Appellant's back to
negotiate directly
with Respondent. Respondent assured Appellant that Respondent always
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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protects the agent. Respondent further stated that if a customer should ever come directly to
the airline, Respondent would "always quote the full gross price"; and that, " we (Respondent)
would never give them (customer) the 5% commission or we (Respondent) would never quote
to them (customer) the price minus the 5% commission." (Tr. 42-43, 216-217)
After these preliminary discussions, Appellant negotiated a series of charter flight contracts
between Respondent and Prestige. These negotiations took place more or less concurrently.
For convenience, each series of flights is referred to separately as a "flight chain". A synopsis
of relevant negotiations follows:
1. Chain "A" Transaction
Following the request of Prestige for charter flights, Appellant made various requests for
quotations to Respondent on or about April 20, 1973 and to other charter airlines. Thereafter,
Respondent quoted prices for the Chain "A" flights to Appellant, including the requirement
that a $2,000.00 deposit would be required for each flight. (R. 818) Prestige paid the required
deposit directly to Respondent and eventually five of the six contracted flights were flown.
(R. 818)
The charter for the Chain "A" flights was arranged by Appellant with Respondent even
though negotiations with another charter airline which quoted prices for the charter flights
slightly lower than Respondent's prices were presented to Prestige. On April 27, 1973, Respondent called Prestige directly and urged Prestige to use Respondent's services even at the
higher prices, which Prestige agreed to do. (R. 817; Tr. 34) After the charter had been arranged
and agreed to by the parties, Respondent sent its standard form which is termed a "Charter
Agency Agreement" to Appellant with instructions to "[pjlease sign this so we can process
your (Appellant's) five per cent commission." (Tr. 34) These instructions were complied with
and the charter agency agreement was signed by the parties. (Ex. D-51)
Notwithstanding the execution of the charter agency agreement on October 9, 1973, during
the negotiations of the Chain "C" and Chain " D " flights, Prestige wrote to Respondent
instructing Respondent to "freeze" the commissions for the Chain "A" flights. (R. 818; Ex.
D-43) That action was initiated by Prestige as the result of a suit commenced by Appellant
against Prestige which suit was subsequently settled on February 27, 1974 prior to the trial of
the instant case. The consideration for such settlement was the delivery of Respondent's check
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price of the Chain "A" flights. (R. 818; Ex. D-53) Appellant asserts no claim in connection
with commissions from the Chain "A" flights against Respondent. (R. 818)
2. Chain "B" Transaction
Appellant makes no claim against Respondent in connection with the single Chain "B"
flight.
3. Chain "C" Transaction
In April and May of 1973 Prestige requested Appellant to negotiate charter contracts for a
series of charter flights to be flown to Jamaica during the winter/spring of 1974. (R. 819)
Appellant sent the Prestige request to a number of airlines including Respondent. (R. 819)
Prior to receiving the requests from Appellant, Respondent had not at any time received any
independent or direct request from Prestige for the same flights. (R. 819) Thereafter, there
followed a series of "routine" phone calls between Appellant, Prestige and Respondent to
coordinate the Prestige request. (R. 821) During all of these negotiations Prestige made it
clear to Respondent that they (Prestige) intended to use Appellant as "agent" for their (Prestige's) future flights. (R. 820)
Appellant spent a substantial amount of time in negotiations concerning the Chain "C"
flights. (Tr. 45) Included among the items of negotiation conducted by Appellant was the
matter of the deposit that might be required in connection with the Chain "C" charter with
Respondent and other airlines. (Tr. 45) Appellant negotiated the deposit amount from $2,000
per flight to $750 per flight which resulted in the securing of the Chain "C" charter business
for Respondent. (R. 822; Tr. 45, 46)
After the charter negotiations had begun, Appellant and Prestige entered into separate
negotiations on the possibility of a merger of the two organizations. (R. 820) One term of the
proposed merger was that Appellant would advance the deposits to cover Prestige's airplane
charters. (R. 822)
Respondent brought the charter quotation to Salt Lake City to present to Appellant.
(R. 821) Respondent prepared certain working documents for the Salt Lake City meeting
which designated Appellant as "agent" in connection with such flights. (Ex. P-47, P-52)
At the meeting in Salt Lake City, Utah, there was complete agreement on the price and
terms for the charter flights. The primary topic of discussion was who could pay the required
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Historically, Prestige had always paid its own deposits. (R. 818) However, Prestige expected
Appellant to pay the deposits for the Chain "C" flights as part of the merger. Nevertheless,
the merger negotiations broke down and as a result, Appellant refused to advance to Respondent the deposits for Prestige. (R. 822) Prestige even attempted to borrow the amount of the
deposit from Appellant, which Appellant likewise refused because the proposed merger was
not completed. (Tr. 92) Although the merger negotiations had broken down, the relationship
between Appellant and Prestige was still fairly viable. Prestige continued to use Appellant as
its agent. (Ex. P-24) Notwithstanding Appellant's refusal to pay the deposits for Prestige,
Appellant had successfully completed all of its obligations as a broker by successfully negotiating the terms of the charter agreement between Respondent and Prestige. (R. 822)
On June 16, 1973, Respondent (Mansfield) left Salt Lake City and went to Chicago, Illinois
to meet directly with Prestige. (R. 822, 823) Prestige executed the charter contract and five
days thereafter mailed a check in the amount of $13,500.00 representing the deposits directly
to Respondent. (R. 823) After some routine modifications with respect to departure points,
14 of the 18 flights originally contracted as Chain "C" were operated and flown at a total
charter price of $432,912.32. (R. 823; Ex. P-50)
Respondent paid Appellant no commission for negotiating and selling the Chain "C"
flights. Rather, Respondent entered into an arrangement with Prestige whereby the 5% commission went directly to Prestige. (R. 824; Tr. 318)
4. Chain "D" Transaction
In April and May of 1973, Prestige requested Appellant to negotiate charter contracts for
a series of charter flights to be flown to Munich, Germany during the summer/fall o( 1974.
(R. 825)
Appellant forwarded the Prestige request to a number of airlines, including Respondent.
(R. 825) Pursuant to Appellant's request, Respondent mailed price quotations to Appellant
on July 10, 1973 for the Prestige flights to Munich. (R. 825; Ex. P-23)
On July 18, 1973, Prestige telephoned Appellant to request certain modifications in the
series of Munich flights. Prestige confirmed the telephone call in a letter. (R. 826; Ex. P-24)
On July 20, 1973, Appellant telephoned Respondent to double check the bids for the modified
Munich dates. However, Respondent responded that it would not give Appellant quotes for
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the modified series of flights to Munich. (R. 826) Respondent then wrote to Appellant stating
in part:
Per my telcon with Sharon, I did not quote the Prestige trips because they have
also requested them from several other agents, and I don't want to be a shill at
the auction.
(Ex. P-27)
Only ten days after the above-described letter, Respondent (Mansfield) went directly to
Prestige to bid on the same charter flights to Munich. (R. 827) During those negotiations with
Prestige, Respondent told Prestige that Respondent would not even transmit the quotes to
Appellant. (R. 827; Ex. D-40)
Respondent completed its private negotiations with Prestige without the knowledge or
consent or participation of Appellant. (R. 828) Those negotiations resulted in a contract for
ten charter flights to Munich. (Ex. P-49) Nine of these ten flights were actually operated.
(Ex. P-50) However, the sales program of Prestige went better than expected and nine additional flights to Munich were added and flown as a part of the same program, for a total
charter price of $1,135,117.20. (Ex. P-50) It is not unusual to have a program sell so well that
extra flights are added. (R. 824)
At the time the Chain "D" flights were consummated, Respondent already held $25,500 of
money paid by Prestige as deposits for Chain "A" and Chain "C"flightsnegotiated by Appellant. (Tr. 277, 278) Prestige utilized those same deposits as deposits for the Chain "D" flights.
(Ex. P-30) This amount represented a "floating deposit" negotiated between Prestige and
Respondent and was assigned to airplanes that Prestige would contract with Respondent
from August 16, 1973 forward. (Tr. 275, 276; Ex. P-30)
Respondent paid Appellant no commission for negotiating and selling the Chain "D"
flights. Rather, Respondent entered into an arrangement with Prestige whereby the 5% commission went directly to Prestige. (R. 828; Tr. 318)
Prestige has continued to be a major customer of Respondent and has purchased several
million dollars of charter flights in addition to Chains "A", "B", "C", and "D". (Tr. 125)
Appellant makes no claim for any commissions on any subsequent charter flights or contracts.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SALE OF CHAIN
"C" AND CHAIN " D " FLIGHTS FROM RESPONDENT TO PRESTIGE
UNDER ORAL BROKERAGE AGREEMENTS AND A UNILATERAL CONTRACT WITH RESPONDENT AND IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT PURSUANT THERETO AS A MATTER OF LAW
The Statement of Facts clearly shows that Appellant's function as a travel agent within the
air transportation industry is essentially that of a broker. The brokerage relationship has been
generally described as follows:

[A] broker is an agent who, for a commission or brokerage fee, bargains or carries
on negotiations in behalf of his principal as an intermediary between the latter and
third persons in transacting business relative to the acquisition of contractual rights,
or to the sale or purchase of any form of property.... [Brokers] act as negotiators
in bringing other persons together to bargain; generally, they ought not to sell or
bargain in their own name, have no implied authority to receive payment, are not
entrusted with possession of goods bought or sold, and have no special property
or lien thereon....
Although a broker is broadly speaking an agent, the word "agent" is a broader
term than "broker", more comprehensive in its legal scope, for while every broker
is in a sense an agent, not every agent is a broker. A broker is distinguishable from
an agent generally by reason of the fact that his authority is of a special and
limited character in most respects. He derives his power ana authority to bind his
principal from the instructions given to him by the principal. A broker is also
distinguished from an agent in that a broker sustains no fixed or permanent
employment by, or relation to, any principal, but holds himself out for employment by the public, generally, his employment in each instance being that of
special agent for a single object, whereas an agent sustains a fixed and permanent
relation to the principal he represents and owes a permanent and continued
allegiance. A broker does not cease to be a broker because he may also in some
transactions act as agent of either or both of the parties thereto. [Emphasis added.]
12 Am Jur. 2d, Brokers n 1 and 3, pp. 112-11 A.
When these general concepts of brokerage are compared with the facts of this case, it
becomes clear that the travel agent, Appellant, was a broker or middleman for the purpose of
negotiating charter flight contracts between the airline, Respondent and the charter customer,
Prestige.1 There is an abundance of authority in support of the proposition that a travel agent
1. In excess of 90% of defendant's charter flights are sold through travel agents.
From 1967-1974 defendant spent approximately $2,793,000 in advertising. [Citation omitted.] Practically all of this
advertising has been spent in cultivating travel agents. [Citation omitted.]
In addition to the advertising program described above, defendant has a staff of approximately 50-60 full time personnel
in the sales department including salesmen. The major effort of these salesmen is to visit travel agents and cultivate
travel agents. [Citation omitted.]
When salesmen visit travel agents, their purpose is to try to get the travel agent to utilize Capitol's services or go to clients
and try to get them to form charter groups to be transported on Capitol. [Citation omitted.] The travel agent usually
understands that there is a five percent agent's commission on charters; if not, the agent discusses the five percent
commission program. [Citation omitted.]
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is essentially a broker and that the brokerage function may involve acting as agent for both
the seller and the buyer in a business transaction if the parties are aware of and have consented to such a relationship. See, Capitol International Airways, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding
(Docket 16370), 46 CAB Reports 385 (1967); Levine v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 322
N.Y.S. 2d 119, 122, 66 Misc. 2d 820 (1971).
The Utah law with respect to brokerage generally is in acord. In Foster v. Blake Heights
Corp., 530 P.2d 815 (Utah 1974), the Supreme Court of Utah said:
It is not always true that a broker who is negotiating a transaction must be
exclusively the agent of one or the other. He may well be a "go-between" acting
for both.
530 P.2d at 817.
An excellent law review article has also noted that the brokerage function of a travel agent
may involve acting as agent for both the buyer and the seller. Wohlmuth, The Liability of
Travel Agents: A Study in the Selection of Appropriate Legal Principles, 40 Temple L.Q. 29, 45,
52 (1966).
In the instant case, Respondent was clearly aware that Appellant was acting in this dual
capacity at the time Respondent entered into the oral contract with Appellant. (R. 816, 819,
820, 825; Tr. 122; Ex. P-2, P-3) Therefore, the fact that Appellant may have been, in some
respects, the agent for Prestige as well as the agent for Respondent does not detract from the
contractual relationship between Appellant and Respondent.
The law is clear that a broker is entitled to a commission on a sale made directly between a
buyer and a seller if the broker operated under an agency or brokerage contract with one of
the parties and was the procuring cause of the sale. The leading Utah case on this point is
Frederick May & Company v. Dunn, 13 U.2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962). In that case, the plaintiff
claimed a commission on the sale of certain corporate stock on which he had an oral contract
to act as a broker. The defendant had sold the stock to a third party who had had prior
dealings with both parties and who had been involved in negotiations for the sale of the stock
with the plaintiff only as a potential financial backer for prospective purchasers. Negotiations
with the plaintiff had always been initiated by the third party through the defendant. The
plaintiff never offered the sale to the third party, but the defendant did. Based on these facts,
the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Utah said:
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[A\ broker must be the procuring cause in order to be entitled to a commission for
such [a] sale. The cases use many different words in conjunction with, or in place
of the words, "procuring cause" to indicate the necessary extent the broker must
induce the sale in order to be entitled to a commission, such as "proximate cause",
"actuating cause", "moving cause", and the like; all meaning about the same
thing. Usually, whether the broker first approaches, or brings to the attention of the
buyer that the property is for sale, or brings the buyer into the picture, has considerable weight in determining whether the buyer [sic] [broker] is the procuring cause of
the sale. The fact that the sale was consummated without participation by the
broker in the finalnegotiation does not preclude him from recovering his commission if the sale was otherwise procured by him. [Emphasis added.]
13 U.2d at 43-44, 368 P.2d at 269.
The court then noted that the broker in Frederick May had not introduced the buyer and
seller, had not offered to sell the stock to the buyer, never considered the buyer to be a potential buyer and that negotiations with the buyer as a financial backer were always initiated by
the buyer through the seller rather than through the broker. Based on the unusual facts
presented, the court held that the broker was not the procuring cause, and, therefore, affirmed
the lower court's decision.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Appellant introduced the seller, Respondent, to the
buyer, Prestige. (Tr. 122; Ex. P-2, P-3) It is further undisputed that Respondent spent nearly
$2.8 million between 1967 and 1974 on advertising to travel agents such as Appellant and
maintained a staff of 50-60 full-time personnel to solicit travel agents such as Appellant to
buy Respondent's services or to act as broker for those services to clients for a five per cent
commission (R. 809-810); and further that Respondent made continuing offers to travel
agents to act as buyers and brokers for its charter flights which were communicated to Appellant's principals. (R. 813) Such advertising has been characterized by Professor Wohlmuth in
his article on the subject as a standing offer of a unilateral brokerage contract which is
accepted when the travel agent brings the customer to the carrier. Wohlmuth, The Liability of
Travel Agents: A Study in the Selection of Appropriate Legal Principles, 40 Temple L.Q. 29, 46
(1966).
With respect to the initial dealings between Respondent and Prestige, it is undisputed that
Prestige, as a new and inexperienced tour operator, contacted Appellant in February and
March of 1973 requesting that Appellant assist it in arranging charter flights to Jamaica
(R. 815-816; Tr. 288); that pursuant to such request, Appellant obtained quotes from Respondent for such flights, known as Chain "A" flights, and negotiated flight dates, points of departure, prices and deposits required in connection with the flights between Respondent and
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Prestige (R. 816-817); and that Respondent entered into a contract with Prestige for such
Chain "A" flights which was later modified as to schedule, such modifications being common
in the charter business. (R. 818, 823-824)
With respect to the Chain "C" flights, it is undisputed that in April and May of 1973 Prestige requested Appellant to assist it in arranging the Chain "C" flights (R. 819); that Appellant
was assured on at least one occasion by Respondent that Respondent would quote prices of
Chain "C" flights and that Respondent would pay Appellant a five percent commission on
such flights if the flights were sold and an agency agreement was executed (R. 819); that
Respondent promised Appellant during the Chain "C" negotiations that Appellant would get
the five per cent commission on any requests which Appellant initiated with Respondent
which were later sold and that Respondent would not sidestep Appellant to deal directly with
Appellant's clients or quote those clients prices net of commissions. (Tr. 42-43, 216-217)
The undisputed facts further show that Appellant, in reliance on the promises of Respondent, obtained quotes on Chain "C" flights and negotiated flight dates, points of departure,
prices and deposits required in connection therewith between Respondent and Prestige
(R. 819, 821-822);

that particularly with respect to the negotiation of required deposits,

Appellant was able to negotiate rates discounted 62% from the normal deposit required by
Respondent to the benefit of Prestige (R. 822; Tr. 45, 275);that Respondent had not received
any request from Prestige on the Chain "C" flights prior to receiving requests from Appellant
(R. 819); that in processing the final paperwork for the Chain "C" flights Respondent twice
formally acknowledged that Appellant was the agent for the transaction (Ex. P-47, P-52); that
historically Prestige had always paid its own deposits (R. 818; Tr. 59); that as part of the
merger negotiations between Appellant and Prestige, Prestige requested that Appellant pay
the deposit on the Chain "C" flights or loan the money to Prestige to pay the same (Tr. 92);
that the merger negotiations between Appellant and Prestige broke down after all negotiations
were completed on flight dates, points of departure, prices and deposits required for the Chain
"C" flights (R. 822); that after Appellant refused to pay Prestige's deposit, Respondent went
directly to Prestige and executed the contract on the Chain "C" flights without concurrent
payment by Prestige of the required deposits (R. 822-823); that Prestige thereafter paid the
deposits which had been negotiated by Appellant on the Chain "C" flights (R. 822-823); that
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the Chain "C" flights were later flown by Respondent on the terms negotiated by Appellant
with routine modifications in schedules except that Respondent sold the Chain "C" flights to
Prestige on a net basis, i.e., gross charter price less the amount of the five per cent brokerage
commission (R. 823-824; Tr. 179-180); that Respondent did not require gross price payment
from Prestige although it had earlier promised Appellant that it would do so and that Appellant had asserted a right to the commissions on Chain "C" flights. (R. 824; Tr. 43) It is further
noted that notwithstanding a claim that Mr. Mansfield, the Regional Vice President for Sales
of Respondent, was confused during his testimony, it is clear from his testimony that where
there is a dispute between the parties claiming entitlement to commissions it is Respondent's
practice to not pay anyone until the dispute is settled. (Tr. 177) Obviously, the withholding
of the commissions by Prestige with the consent of Respondent is a clear breach of Respondent's practice.
With respect to the original Chain "D" flights, it is undisputed that in April and May of
1973 Prestige requested that Appellant assist it in arranging charter flights to Munich,
Germany which became known as Chain "D" flights (R. 825); that Respondent agreed to
quote prices on such flights to Appellant and to pay Appellant a five per cent commission if
the flights sold and an agency agreement was executed by Prestige (R. 825); that Respondent
promised Appellant on more than one occasion during the Chain "D" negotiations that
Appellant would receive the five percent commission on any requests which Appellant
initiated with Respondent which later sold and that Respondent would not sidestep Appellant
to deal directly with Appellant's clients or quote those clients prices net of commission.
(Tr. 42-43, 216-217)
The facts are further undisputed that Appellant in reliance on the promise of Respondent
that it would receive a five percent commission did obtain quotes from Respondent on Chain
"D" flights which it communicated and negotiated with Prestige (R. 825; Tr. 42);that Prestige
later requested that Appellant assist it in negotiating a modified schedule of flights under
Chain "D" (R. 826); that Respondent refused to quote such flights to Appellant at a point in
time immediately following Respondent's sidestepping of Appellant to close the Chain "C"
flights' contract directly with Prestige (R. 826-827); that Respondent subsequently negotiated
Chain "D" flights directly with Prestige (R. 827); and that Respondent modified its proposal
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on Chain " D " flights so that it could meet lower bids which had been negotiated for Prestige
by Appellant. (R. 827-828)
Finally, the evidence is undisputed that Respondent created a unique deposit system for
Prestige which allowed Prestige to utilize the deposits negotiated by Appellant on the Chain
"A" and Chain "C" flights as a floating deposit for the Chain " D " flights and any future
business between Prestige and Respondent (R. 822; Tr. 168-169; Ex. P-30); that the Chain
" D " flights were later flown by Respondent on the terms which had originally been negotiated
by Appellant with routine modifications in schedules and the addition of certain flights, except
that Prestige was allowed to use the floating deposit and the flights were sold to Prestige at an
amount less the 5% brokerage commission (R. 828; Tr. 179-180); and that Respondent did not
require from Prestige the payment of the gross charter price although it had earlier promised
Appellant that it would and Appellant had asserted a right to the commissions on the Chain
" D " flights. (R. 828; Tr. 43)
In the wake of such an enormous wave of undisputed facts, it is abundantly clear that
Appellant was, in fact, the procuring cause of the sale of the Chain "C" and Chain " D " flights
under the requirements of Frederick May. In fact, Respondent has never contended that
Appellant was not the procuring cause of the sales of the Chain "C" and Chain " D " flights.
There simply are no facts to support such a position and Respondent knows that that is the
case. Yet, the trial court refused to make a finding on this material issue
The undisputed facts also clearly establish that Appellant was operating under a brokerage
or agency agreement with Respondent. This agreement was established both as the result of
Appellant's performance by bringing Prestige to Respondent under the unilateral offer made
by Respondent through its advertising, offering Appellant and numerous other travel agents a
five per cent commission for acting as its agent in negotiating for the sale of its charter flights
to clients of the agents (see, Wohlmuth, supra), and the direct oral agreements made with
Appellant as a result of Appellant's contacts with Respondent concerning the flights for
Prestige.
Under Frederick May, Appellant is entitled to a five per cent commission on the Chain "C"
and Chain " D " flights sold by Respondent to Prestige because Appellant was operating under
an agency or brokerage agreement and because Appellant was the procuring cause of the
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that the broker participate in final negotiations or consummation of the sale to be entitled to
his commission if the sale was otherwise procured by the broker. In the instant case, the
signing of the charter agency agreement is obviously a mere formality of closing and the
modified schedules are clearly foreseeable and simply matters of final negotiation.
The Utah rule is generally recognized and accepted. In Abels v. Iceland Products, Inc.,
274 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1960), the plaintiff had served as a broker for the defendant under an
oral contract for a five per cent commission through various business entities over the course
of approximately four years. The defendant terminated the brokerage agreement and commenced selling directly to the plaintiffs customers. The trial court awarded commissions to
the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff had been, prior to his termination, the procuring
cause on certain of the sales made subsequent to such termination. There was undisputed
evidence that prior to termination the buyers had been brought to the seller and the broker
had conducted negotiations on the sales in question. The court held that, even though the
total amounts of sales to be made had not been finally determined prior to termination and
that with respect to one of the customers the prices were renegotiated after termination,
plaintiff was entitled to commission on the sales made pursuant to the dealings in which he
had engaged prior to termination.
There is an abundance of case law on the subject of the right of an agent or broker who is
the procuring cause of the sale in real estate transactions to a commission on such sale after
the agent or broker has been circumvented by the buyer and seller. Unfortunately, it is not
unusual for a buyer and seller introduced by a real estate agent or broker to attempt to "save
the commission" by either feigning disinterest for a period of time and later consumiating the
sale or by going directly behind the broker's back to consummate a sale at a price less the
broker's commission or conclude such sale on slightly different terms. See, Tucker v. Green,
96 Ariz. 371, 396 P.2d 1 (1964); Hiller v. Moore Realty Co., 483 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1971);
Hanson v. Schletzbaum, 192 Kan. 265, 387 P.2d 176 (1963); Lindsey v. Cranfill, 61 N.M. 228,
297 P.2d 1055 (1956).
The principle that a broker who is the procuring cause of a sale is entitled to a commission
has been upheld in a recent case in the Arizona Court of Appeals under facts strikingly similar
to those in the instant case. In Mohamed v. Robbins, 23 Ariz. App. 195, 531 P.2d 928 (1975),
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contract
with
defendant
under which the
Digitized
by the
Howard
Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark the
Law School,
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

defendant promised that if a sale was made after the 90 day period to a buyer with whom the
plaintiff was negotiating at the expiration of the agreement the plaintiff would still receive his
commission. The plaintiff commenced negotiations with the highway department on the sale
of the property. However, because of bureaucratic and procedural delays, negotiations could
not be commenced in earnest until after the listing agreement had expired. The highway
department informed the plaintiff that it could not negotiate through him as the broker unless
he obtained a written authorization from the defendant. The defendant refused to give such
an authorization. Nearly a year after the brokerage agreement had expired and following a
series of negotiations between the buyer and seller, a deal was consummated without participation by the broker. The Court said:
The dispositive question before us is whether plaintiff was the procuring cause
of the sale...
It is well settled real estate law that generally a broker who is the "procuring
cause" of a sale under a listing agreement is entitled to a commission. [Citation
omitted.] In the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, if it can be shown
that acts constituting the procuring cause occurred during the life of the listing
contract, the commission has been earned even though the time provisions thereof
may have expired prior to the consummation of the sale. [Citation omitted.]
In Clark v Ellsworth, [citation], the term "procuring cause" was defined as
follows:
"[A] cause originating a series of events which, without break in their continuity result in accomplishment of the prime objective of employment of
the broker—producing a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy real estate
on the owner's terms." (Emphasis in original)

The fact that plaintiff took no part in the concluding negotiations is immaterial
as long as the procuring cause is gleaned in his favor from the evidence. [Citations
omitted.]
531 P.2d at 929-931.
The court went on to point out that it was immaterial that the plaintiff was not present in
the concluding negotiations and the consummation of the sale and that the defendant had
rejected an offer of the buyer during that period. Under the facts of that case, the court
concluded that plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale.
Without belaboring the point, the facts in the instant case indicate clearly that Appellant
was the procuring cause of the sale of Chain "C" and Chain " D " charter flights to Prestige.
Yet Respondent seeks to defeat Appellant's entitlement to commissions for those sales simply
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already initiated, and, in the case of the Chain "C" flights, completed negotiations. Chain
"D" negotiations would no doubt have been completed had Respondent not refused to quote
prices on the modified series to Appellant. Such a claim rings familiar to the seller's refusal
in Mohamed to sign an authorization after the fact. Under the holding of Frederick May,
Abels, Mohamed and a vast majority of the cases on point, it is clear that Appellant is entitled
to its commission whether or not the charter agency agreement was signed by Prestige,
whether or not Appellant participated in final negotiations or the consummation of the sale,
and whether or not Appellant was terminated as the broker or agent prior to the consummation of the sale because Appellant operating under a brokerage agreement was the
procuring cause of the sales which were eventually consummated. Any other holding would
be inconsistent with precedent and manifestly unjust to Appellant.

POINT II
THE CONDUCT OF RESPONDENT IN DEALING DIRECTLY WITH THE
CUSTOMER (PRESTIGE) PROCURED BY APPELLANT CONSTITUTED
A WAIVER OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE CHARTER AGENCY
AGREEMENT BE EXECUTED BY PRESTIGE AND FURTHER CONSTITUTED A BREACH OF THE BROKERAGE AGREEMENT AND AGENCY
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES
Respondent contends that Appellant is not entitled to commissions on the Chain "C" and
Chain "D"flightssolely because Prestige refused to sign a document entitled "Charter Agency
Agreement" in connection with such flights. The brokerage arrangement between Appellant
and Respondent contemplated that the three parties (Appellant, Respondent and Prestige)
would each sign Respondent's standard form brokerage agreement. (R. 819, 825) The apparent
intent was that a separate charter agency agreement would be signed for each "chain" of
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flights. The three parties did sign such an agreement in connection with the Chain "A" flights.
(Ex. D-51)
The refusal of Prestige to sign the charter agency agreement should not defeat Appellant's
claim for a five percent commission on the Chain "C" and Chain " D " flights because:
1. Respondent's Own Conduct in Dealing Directly with Prestige Prevented Execution of the
Charter Agency Agreements.
The undisputed facts in the instant case, as more fully set forth in the statement of facts
and Point I supra, clearly demonstrate that Respondent hindered and prevented the performance of the condition by dealing directly with Prestige at prices net of broker's commission
and refusing to quote prices on Chain " D " flights as modified to Appellant.
It is undisputed that negotiations on Chain "C" flights were completed during or prior to
Respondent's meetings with Appellant in Salt Lake City, Utah in June of 1973 and that prior
to such meetings Respondent had agreed to quote prices on Chain " D " flights to Appellant.
It is further undisputed that after such meetings and in the middle of negotiations on Chain
" D " flights Respondent immediately proceeded to deal directly with Prestige to consummate
the sale of Chain "C" flights, refused to quote prices on the modified Chain " D " flights to
Appellant and thereafter negotiated Chain " D " flights as modified directly with Prestige and
consummated their sale. It is likewise undisputed that the prices paid by Prestige for Chain
"C" and Chain " D " flights were net of the five percent brokerage commissions and finally
that the five percent was withheld by Prestige without the authorization or consent of Appellant and that such withholding was in direct conflict with Respondent's practice of holding
disputed commissions until the entitlement thereto had been determined.
There is only one reasonable inference from these facts, i.e., that Respondent gave Prestige
the opportunity to bypass Appellant and to "save" the five percent commission on its dealings
with Respondent. Thus Respondent by its actions and in violation of its promise to Appellant
hindered and prevented Appellant from getting the charter agency agreements signed by
Prestige. Respondent, in fact, gave Prestige an "incentive" not to sign the charter agency
agreements. This "incentive" was the five percent brokerage commission which equalled an
amount in excess of $75,000.00. (Ex. P-50) The "incentive" also included a unique deposit
arrangement which would serve to reduce the "up front" flight deposit amounts cementing
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a long term relationship between Respondent and Prestige. There is no question but that the
deal was highly successful (Tr. 125) and that Appellant was effectively excised therefrom.
Under such clear evidence of interference, hindrance and bad faith Respondent waived
and excused the condition of signing the charter agency agreement and is estopped from
raising the condition as a defense as a matter of law.

It is by now a "hornbook" rule of settled law that a party to a contract cannot escape his
obligations under a contract by claiming failure of a condition when it was his conduct which
prevented the fulfillment of the condition. See, Concrete Specialties v. H. C. Smith Construction Co., 423 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir. 1970); Gridiron Steel Co. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
361 F.2d 791, 794 (6th Cir. 1966); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. West Georgia National Bank,
387 F. Supp. 1090, 1095 (D. Ga. 1974); Security National Life Insurance Co. v. Pre-Need
Camelback Plan, Inc., 19 Ariz. App. 580, 509 P.2d 652, 654 (1973); Restatement of Contracts
§

295 (1932). The party taking such a position is regarded as having waived or excused the

condition or as being estopped from raising it in his defense. See, Fowler v. Dana, 7 Ariz.
App. 72, 436 P.2d 166, 168 (1968); Weather-Guard Industries, Inc. v. Fairfield Savings & Loan
Assn., 248 N.E. 2d 794 (111. 1969); Cladianos v. Friedhoff, 69 Nev. 41, 240 P.2d 208, 210 (1952);
Rogers v. Goodwin, 208 Okl. 110, 253 P.2d 844, 846 (1953).
It is interesting to note that in Capitol International Airways, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding
(Docket 16370), 46 CAB Reports 385 (1967), Respondent contended that it should be excused
from its contractual obligations because the travel agent's conduct prevented it from performance. 46 CAB Reports at 387.
"Broker cases" such as the instant case often present a situation in which a broker has
presented to a seller a buyer who is ready, willing and able to purchase. However, the broker
is prevented from consummating the sale because the seller either refuses to sell or deals
directly with the buyer in an effort to "save" the broker's commission. See, Abels v. Iceland
Products, Inc., 21A F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1960); Weniger v. Union Center Plaza Associates, 387 F.
Supp. 849 (S. D. N. Y. 1974); Mohamed v. Robbins, 23 Ariz. App. 195, 531 P.2d 928 (1975);
Manzo v. Park, 220 Ark. 216, 247 S.W.2d 12 (1952); Hiller v. Moore Realty Co., 483 P.2d 415
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N.M. 228, 297 P.2d 1055 (1956); Bonn v. Summers, 249 N.C. 357, 106 S.E.2d 470 (1959).
In Weniger, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York stated and cited
the applicable principle of law very clearly:
It should be observed, however, that even where the broker and seller expressly
provide that there shall be no right to a commission unless some condition is fulfilled,
and the condition is not performed, the seller will nevertheless be liable if he is
responsible for the failure to perform the condition. [Citing cases.] [Emphasis in
original.]
In the instant case, the Court finds as a fact that the events specified in the
payment provision of the brokerage agreement failed to occur solely as the result
of defendants' conduct...Such being the case, defendants cannot now invoke the
conditions precedent recited in the August 1967 agreement as a bar to Plantiffs
claim.
If a promisor himself is the cause of the failure ofperformance of a condition upon
which his own liability depends, he cannot take advantage of the failure [Citations
omitted.] "It is a well settled and salutary rule that a party cannot insist upon a
condition precedent, when its non-performance has been caused by himself."
[Citing a case.] "It is as effective an excuse of performance of a condition that the
promisor has hindered performance as that he has actually prevented it." [Citations
omitted.] [Emphasis added.]
387 F. Supp. at 863-864.
In Lindsey v. Cranfill, the New Mexico Supreme Court summarized the rule as it applies to
the instant case when it said:
We find the law to be that if the agent is employed for the purpose of procuring
a buyer and actually puts forth effort about his agency, and procures a buyer to
whom the owner later sells, and because of the fraud, wrongful act or bad faith of
the owner it is made impossible for the agent to further pursue his efforts to bring
about a sale, the agent is nevertheless entitled to the reasonable value of his
services. [Citations omitted.]
297 P.2d at 1059.
It is clear that Utah follows these well established rules of law. See, Fischer v. Johnson,
525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974); Haymore v. Levinson, 8 U.2d 66, 328 P.2d 307 (1958), Curtis v.
Mortenson, 1 U.2d 354, 267 P.2d 237 (1954).
Whatever excuses or windowdressing Respondent may offer, the net legal effect is that
Respondent fired Appellant in the middle of the negotiations. Respondent spent substantial
sums in advertising to promote travel agents to sell Respondent's Charter flights. Nowhere
did Respondent say in its advertising that it would quote on some flights and not on others.
Nowhere did Respondent say in its advertising that it would deal directly with certain select
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customers after the travel agent had made the introductions and commenced negotiations.
Moreover, Respondent specifically agreed to give Appellant the price quotations for the
Prestige account. ( R. 819, 825)
The law is well settled that a broker whose employment is wrongfully terminated may sue
for damages and is entitled to recover such prospective profits as would have been his but for
the wrongful termination. Abels v. Iceland

Products, Inc., 274 F. 2d 213 (7th Cir. 1960);

Manzo v. Park, 220 Ark. 216, 247 S.W.2d 12 (1952); Bonn v. Summers, 249 N.C. 357, 106
S.E.2d 470 (1959); Restatement (Second) of Agency

§

455 (1958). In the instant case, Appellant

is clearly entitled to commissions on the Chain "C" and Chain " D " flights.

2. The Execution of the Cfiarter Agency Agreement Was Not a Condition But Was Rather
a Mere Formality.
If the execution of the charter agency agreement was as important as Respondent now
contends, Respondent would have circulated the same to be executed at the beginning of the
parties' relationship (i.e., before the charter contract negotiations began). However, the record
shows that Capitol never produces the document for signatures before the charter contract
negotiations. Capitol always circulates the document for signatures after all the negotiations
for the sale of the charters are completed. (R. 811) The fact that the charter agency agreement
is always signed after the broker finishes his work clearly shows that its execution is a mere
formality.
The parties did execute a charter agency agreement for Chain "A" flights. (Ex. D-51) However, Respondent did not request Appellant's signature on the charter agency agreement
until eighteen days after the Chain "A" flights had been negotiated by Appellant and finalized
between Prestige and Respondent. (R. 817) In fact, in transmitting the charter agency agreement for Appellant's signature, Respondent stated, "[E]nclosed please find our agency agreement covering the six Prestige Vacation charters to Montego Bay....We must have these forms
in order to process your 5% commission." [Emphasis added.] (Ex. D-l 1) Respondent's conduct
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with respect to the Chain "A" flights further demonstrated that it considered the execution
of the charter agency agreement as a mere formality rather than as the essential condition
and "binding event" which Respondent now urges the court to find it. The charter agency
agreement was executed on Chain "A" flights prior to the time when Respondent and Prestige
decided to cut Appellant out of the arrangements in late June or early July of 1973. However,
in the Fall of 1973 after Respondent and Prestige had developed a close relationship, the
Chain "A" flights had been flown and paid for and Appellant's commission was due and
notwithstanding the fact that all parties had signed the agreement (Ex. D-51), Prestige
instructed Respondent to "freeze" the payment of Appellant's commission. (R. 818; Ex. D-43)
Respondent promptly complied and continued to comply, notwithstanding Appellant's
demand for payment of the commissions, until suit was filed and settlement was reached with
Prestige. (R. 818; Ex. D-53) Surely, if Respondent considered the execution of the charter
agency agreement to be such a "binding" factor in the relationship with Appellant, it would
not have obeyed Prestige's conflicting instruction.
3. Enforcement of the Condition Would Result in an Unconscionable Forfeiture After Substantial Performance.
It is well established that forfeitures are not favored by the courts Green v. Palfreymen,
109 U. 291, 300, 166 P.2d 215, 219 (1946), opinion amended and rehearing denied, 109 U. 303,
175 P.2d 213 (1946); and that a court is loathe to enforce a forfeiture. Swain v. Salt Lake Real
Estate & Investment Co., 3 U.2d 121, 123, 279 P.2d 709, 711 (1955). This is especially true
where the party that would forfeit all rights as a result of enforcement has substantially
performed his obligations under the contract. See, Mackey v. Eva, 80 Ida. 260, 328 P.2d 66, 70
(1958); 5 Williston on Contracts * 805, p. 838 (3d ed. 1961).
Thus, the condition of having the charter agency agreements executed its rendered
unenforceable because it unconscionably required substantial performance by the Appellant
prior to its fulfillment and left its fulfillment at the discretion of a third party (Prestige) whose
interests might then be, and in the instant case were then, in fact, adverse to those of Appellant. Thus enforcement of the condition would operate as a total forfeiture of Appellant's
rights after substantial performance.
As more fully set forth in the Statement of Facts, supra, Respondent entered into an oral
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to transmit bids to Prestige for charter flights and through negotiation of charter prices,
schedules and deposits required on the Chain "C" and Chain " D " flights to secure the business
for Respondent. Appellant was to perform these services, to bring Respondent and Prestige
together in an arrangement that both could live with.
It is undisputed that in fact Appellant did perform each and every term of the agreement.
The flights were secured from Respondent and were flown as negotiated, contracted and
agreed upon. (R. 823-824, 828; Ex. P-50) Then after the parties reached complete agreement
on the terms of the sale and as an adjunct to consummate the sale.

Appellant was to secure

the execution by Prestige of a charter agency agreement as a final requirement prior to receipt
of Appellant's brokerage commission.
However, by reason of Respondent's direct dealing with Prestige, the agreement was not
executed by Prestige because Prestige obviously had received what it wanted and no longer
needed the services of Appellant and Respondent had received what it sought, i.e., charter contracts representing in excess of $1.5 million of charter flights. Even more importantly through
the manipulation of deposit arrangements and payment of commissions to Prestige, Respondent would and did cement an on-going business relationship with Prestige.
Appellant therefore submits that as heretofore argued in Point I, supra, Appellant is entitled
to the commissions irrespective of the execution of the charter agency agreements because
under the undisputed facts Appellant was the procuring cause of the sale of the Chain "C"
and Chain " D " flights under oral brokerage contracts with Respondent and as such is entitled
to the commissions as a matter of law.
However, even assuming arguendo that the execution of the charter agency agreement was
a condition precedent to Appellant's right to commissions under such brokerage contracts
(which assumption ignores the unilateral contract and the oral contracts with Respondent
which required no execution and further ignores Appellant's performance thereunder),
Respondent waived that condition and is estopped from raising it as a defense because its
unfair conduct in negotiating directly with Prestige during the middle of Appellant's negotiations and allowing Prestige to purchase the Chain "C" and Chain " D " flights at an amount
net of commission, prevented the condition from being fulfilled. Furthermore, the execution
of the agreement must have been a formality or the condition itself is rendered unenforceable
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POINT III
RESPONDENT CANNOT AVOID LIABILITY TO APPELLANT FOR COMMISSIONS DUE APPELLANT UNDER THE REGULATIONS OF THE CIVIL
AERONAUTICS BOARD
That the judgment rendered by the court on September 22, 1975 (R. 846-847), was based
in part upon a consideration by the court of Rules and Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics
Board is clear upon a reading of the judgment itself and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law made and entered by the court on September 11, 1975. (R. 797-804)
Indeed, the Court found that under the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Appellant may not recover from Respondent because there is no written agreement between them
(Conclusion of Law VI [R. 803]), and that notwithstanding the testimony of Mr. DeBry, an
officer of Appellant, that Appellant is not directly regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board
(Tr. 16), the Court found that the regulations promulgated by the Civil Aeronautics Board
"...are binding on Plaintiff (Appellant) and Defendant (Respondent)". (Conclusion of Law
IV [R. 803])
It is ironic that Capitol should rely on Part 208 of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Economic
Regulations, effective June 21, 1973 (see, Federal Register, Vol. 38, No. 104, pp. 14274, et seq.,)
to shield itself from liability for the payment of commissions to Appellant when the clear
purpose of the Regulations is to place limitations on the operating authority of supplemental
air carriers such as Respondent for the obvious purpose of protecting the public from
unrestricted authority of the supplemental air carrier. Furthermore, in a previous case
involving a charter flight dispute brought before the Civil Aeronautics Board, Respondent
had contended that where the issues involved were of contract and agency, the issue should
be left to the courts and decided, presumably, on principles of contract and agency law.
Capitol International Airways, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding (Docket 16370), 46 CAB Reports
385, 395 (1967).
Section 208.31a of the Civil Aeronautics Board Regulations, supra, provides with respect
to written agreements with ticket agents the following:
Each agreement between a supplemental air carrier and any ticket or cargo agent
shall be reduced to writing and signed by all the parties thereto, if it relates to any
of the following subjects.
(d) The charter or lease of aircraft.
Federal Register, Vol.
38, No. 104 - Thursday, May 31, 1973, at 14277.
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While it may be seriously questioned that said Regulation even applies to a broker such as
Appellant under the facts of the instant case, assuming arguendo that it may apply, it is clear
from the statute under which the regulations are promulgated that said Regulation does not
apply in the instant case.
While there is no question as to the right of the Civil Aeronautics Board to promulgate
regulations to govern air carriers, XheFederal Aviation Program, 49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1301, et seq.
contains a specific statutory provision with respect to available remedies and provides:
Sec. 1506. Remedies Not Exclusive.
Nothing contained in this Chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies
now existing at common law or by statute, but "the provisions of this chapter are in
addition to such remedies. (Public Law citation omitted) [Emphasis added]
49 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1506
The plain language of the Statute clearly indicates that the Regulation cannot abridge or
abrogate any common law remedy.
There can be no serious question raised to the proposition that an oral brokerage contract
is enforceable at common law and this is especially true where there has been full or partial
performance of the same by a contracting party.
The general rule with respect to oral brokerage contracts is statedat 12 Am Jur 2d, Brokers
§

41, p. 803 as follows:
Statutes requiring contracts for the employment of brokers to be in writing are
in derogation of the common law and should be strictly construed and interpreted
in the light of the legislative intent promoting their enactment. The Courts will not
permit such a statute to be used as an instrument of fraud. (Emphasis added)
Undoubtedly relying on the language of

§

208.302 of said Regulation the trial court found

that as a result of the settlement of a suit between Appellant and Prestige, Appellant received
from Prestige a sum of money which constituted at least in part commissions on the Chain
"C" and Chain " D " flights. (Finding of Fact XV [R. 802]) The Court made and entered its
conclusion of law based thereon that the Appellant may not recover from Respondent
"because Plaintiff (Appellant) has already received commissions for the same flights." (Conclusion of Law VII [R. 803])
Section 208.302 of the Civil Aeronautics Board Regulations, supra, provides with respect
to commissions paid Digitized
by direct
air carriers to travel agents, the following:
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No direct air carriers shall pay a travel agent any commission in excess of 5 per
cent of the total charter price or more than the commission related to charter
flights paid to an agent by a carrier certificated to fly the same route, whichever
is greater.
Federal Register, Vol. 38, No. 104 - Thursday, May 31, 1973, at 14281.
The trial court found that as a result of the settlement of a suit between Appellant and
Prestige, Appellant received from Prestige a sum of money which constituted at least in part
commissions on the Chain "C" and Chain " D " flights. (Finding of Fact XV [R. 802]) The
Court made and entered its conclusion of law based thereon that the Appellant may not
recover from Respondent "because Plaintiff (Appellant) has already received commissions
for the same flights." (Conclusion of Law VII [R. 803])
The Civil Aeronautics Board Regulations do not direct the air carrier as to whom the applicable commissions should be paid in the event of an existing dispute between the travel agent and
its customers as to the right to receive such commissions.
Respondent is attempting to shield itself from liability to Appellant in reliance on such regulations where there was an admitted dispute as to Appellant's claim for commissions on the
Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights. This position was argued by Respondent notwithstanding the
testimony of Mr. Mansfield, Regional Vice President of Sales, that where a dispute has arisen
between two parties as to their entitlement to commissions that Respondent doesn't "pay anyone
until the dispute is settled". (Tr. 177) Rather than following Respondent's normal, usual business
practice in that regard, Respondent permitted the deduction of the five per cent commission on
the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights by Prestige. (R. 823-824, 828; Tr. 179-180)
The Record in the instant case is absolutely devoid of any factual support for the conclusion
of law made and entered by the trial court. In fact, the Stipulation of the parties filed with the
court with respect to the Chain "C" flights and the Chain " D " flights provides that "Prestige
deducted the five per cent commission from monies collected from charterers and nothing
was paid by Capitol (Respondent) to Plaintiff (Appellant)." (R. 824, 828) Thus it is clear that
Respondent did not pay commissions to Appellant and it is likewise clear that Prestige did
not pay Appellant with respect to any of the flights in question, i.e., Chain "C" and Chain
" D " flights. (Tr. 318)
Assuming arguendo that Appellant did receive as a part of its settlement with Prestige
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certain amounts representing commissions on the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights, which
assumption ignores the stipulation of the parties and the expressed language of the Release
between Appellant and Prestige (Ex. D-53), it neces sarily follows, even after the application of
the regulations adopted by the Court as a basis for its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, that Appellant would not be precluded from receiving the balance of such commissions.
However, the facts with respect to the release of Prestige by Appellant as evidenced by the
executed release between the parties (Ex. D-53), clearly reflects that such release was executed
in connection with the commissions due on the Chain "A" flights (R. 818), for which Appellant makes no claim against Respondent in the instant litigation and the parties so stipulated.
It is further evident that the release was executed by and between Appellant and Prestige and
Respondent was in no way a party thereto.
To permit Respondent to shield itself from liability to Appellant based upon the regulations
of the Civil Aeronautics Board would be to permit the Civil Aeronautics Board to usurp the
function of the judicial system in determining the entitlement to brokerage commissions where
a dispute exists between parties. Such a determination by this Court would likewise permit an
airline to pay to or permit withholding of a brokerage commission by a customer without
regard to such airlines contracts, legal obligations and without responsibility for such conduct.
Certainly, the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board do not contemplate such a result.
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POINT IV
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ADOPTED BY THE COURT WERE NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT OR THE EVIDENCE AND
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET THE SAME ASIDE AND THE JUDGMENT
ENTERED THEREON OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR NEW TRIAL
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED
On motion timely made and filed, Appellant moved to set aside the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment entered thereon or in the alternative for a new trial.
(R. 829-845)
Certain of the Findings of Fact which the court adopted as Conclusions of Law to the
extent that any of the same were Conclusions of Law and vice versa (Finding of Fact XVI
[R. 802], Conclusion of Law X [R. 804]) were wholly unsupported by any evidence at the trial.
With respect to Finding of Fact XV adopted by the Court (R. 802), as discussed in Point III,
supra, there is a total lack of any evidence that Appellant received any sums as payment of
commissions due on the Chain "C" and Chain " D " flights in connection with the settlement
of the Prestige litigation or other wise. In point of fact, such a finding is directly contrary to
the stipulation of the parties which stipulation states as follows:
On 2/27/74 plaintiff and Prestige entered into a settlement agreement and a
release was signed. A copy of that agreement is attached hereto and appears as
exhibit D53 hereof. A copy of the release is attached hereto marked exhibit D53.
On 2/27/74 the check of Capitol payable to Prestige and plaintiff in the sum of
$7, 287.00 was delivered to plaintiff, which check represented the agent's commission of five per cent of the sales price of the five flights operated as Chain "A".
(R. 818)
Furthermore, the evidence (including the stipulation of the parties) is clear and undisputed
that the commissions on the Chain "C" and Chain " D " flights were retained by Prestige.
(R. 824, 828; Tr. 178, 179, 180) As such, the adoption by the court of such finding and Conclusion of Law VII (R. 803) based thereon was clearly error.
The court recognized the obvious problem in adopting this finding as indicated in the
following discussion between the court

anc[

counsel during the argument of Appellant's

motion:
THE COURT: What do you want to do with finding fifteen then?
MR. SESSIONS: I want to delete it.
MR. CHILD: Oh, Your Honor, this is one of the legal theories upon which this
case should be dismissed.
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THE COURT: But not one upon which I base my findings.
(Tr. 345)
That the Court was uneasy with respect to all the findings adopted was further demonstrated during argument as follows:
THE COURT: These are the facts that you stipulated to and I have no choice
but to adopt them as the findings of the Court.
MR. SESSIONS: We agree.
MR. CHILD: Right.
THE COURT: They are probably a little more extensive than we would normally make but can't we base our conclusions on these facts?
MR. SESSIONS: We certainly can base our conclusions on those facts. We
disagree with the conclusions.
THE COURT: I understand you do. If you didn't we wouldn't be here. Why
don't we do that?
THE COURT: No. I mean as a substitute.
MR. CHILD: Oh, I think we need the findings of fact as entered also, Your
Honor. They have been well thought out and they support any theories that are
required. You see, the stipulated findings of fact were calculated in such a way as
to express both sides' theories of the case, the facts that both sides could live with
and they were not conclusive on the factual findings that the Court had to make.
THE COURT: Well, are there facts included in your findings that don't appear
in the stipulation?
MR. CHILD: Yes.
MR. SESSIONS: Yes.
THE COURT: I see.
MR. CHILD: That's why we had the trial.
THE COURT: Well, then I don't know how to reconcile it.
(Tr. 337, 338)
Furthermore, the court's indecision with respect to the entire matter was indicated in the
court's letter to Counsel of September 11, 1975 (R. 795) and statement at the argument of
Appellant's motion. (Tr. 327) In the end, and notwithstanding the complexity of the trial and
the issues presented, and further notwithstanding the stipulation of the parties which clearly
prohibits the introduction of evidence which contradicts the facts as stipulated (R. 806), the
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court adopted the findings and conclusions (as modified and expanded by the stipulation of
the parties) (R. 864-865), submitted by Respondent's counsel including Respondent's "associated California counsel" (R. 794, 805), who not only did not attend the trial but had not
even read a transcript thereof as the same was only later prepared. (R. 869)
Appellant requested the Court to make separate and specific findings of material issues
presented to and tried by the Court pursuant to Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which states in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury... the court shall find
the facts specially and shall state separately its conclusions of law thereon....
The first material issue concerning which the court declined to make and enter any specific
finding as requested by Appellant was whether or not Appellant's activities in bringing the
parties (Respondent and Prestige) together was the procuring cause for the Chain "C" and
Chain " D " flights. (R. 834-835; Tr. 348) Appellant's complaint further alleges that because of
Appellant's introduction and assistance Respondent has in fact sold many charter flights to
Prestige. (See, Paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs Complaint, R. 360) These allegations, together with
the testimony at the trial, raise the issue as to whether Appellant's activities and efforts were
in fact the procuring cause of the charter contract and the flights flown pursuant thereto,
which Respondent ultimately entered into with Prestige. The court, in denying Appellant's
motion (R. 862-863), made and entered no finding on this material issue, notwithstanding the
evidence adduced at trial and contained in the stipulation of the parties that the Respondent
did not know of Prestige prior to the introduction thereof by Appellant to Respondent and
further that Appellant conducted substantial negotiations, expended time and effort in negotiation for the securing of the Chain "C" and initial Chain " D " flights, including negotiations
for deposit reductions, without compensation or commission of any kind, as hereinbefore
set forth.
The court further declined to make and enter a finding of fact on the material issue of
whether or not an agency relationship existed between Respondent and Appellant and
whether or not Respondent in dealing directly with Prestige engaged in unfair dealings and
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interference with the basic agency relationship. (R. 835-839; Tr. 348-349)
The finding urged by Appellant is consistent with the evidence as to the nature of Respondent's business. Respondent spent substantial sums on advertising and in addition employed
salesmen, all for the purpose of trying "to get the travel agent to utilize Capitol's services
or to go to client's and try to get them to form charter groups to be transported on Capitol."
(R. 809) Such a finding is further material with respect to the modified series of flights to
Munich, Germany, Chain "D", because the fact that the original four flights, dates and destinations in Chain " D " were modified, revised and expanded to match the success of sales
programs, is typical and anticipated. (R. 823) Finally, such a finding clearly raises the issue as
to whether or not Respondent can deal directly with Prestige which had been procured by
Appellant without liability to Appellant therefor and in so doing, whether Respondent has
waived the condition precedent to the payment of commissions which it claims, to wit: the
execution of the charter agency agreement.
This court has considered the matter of the necessity of the trial court making and entering
findings of fact on all material issues on a number of occasions. In Gaddis Investment Company v Morrison, 3 U.2d 43, 278 P.2d 284 (1954), this court, considering an issue raised in
defendant's answer but with respect to which the trial court made no finding, stated as follows:

It has been frequently held that the failure of the trial court to make findings
of fact on all material issues is reversible error where it is prejudical. [Citations
omitted.] [Emphasis added.]

3 U.2d at 45, 278 P.2d at 285. (See also, LeGrand Johnson Corp., v. Peterson, 18 U.2d 260,
262-263, 420 P.2d 615, 616-617 (1966).
Notwithstanding the materiality of these issues which the record indicates is the very heart
of the instant case, the court denied Appellant's motion (R. 864) which Appellant respectfully
submits was error.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully submits that under the undisputed
evidence Appellant was the procuring cause for the sale of the Chain "C" and Chain " D "
flights between Respondent and Prestige.
The conduct of Respondent in dealing directly with Prestige during the conclusion of
negotiations for the Chain "C" flights and during the middle of negotiations for the Chain
" D " flights and Respondent's refusal to quote the Chain " D " flights as modified to Appellant,
constituted a violation of the agreement between Appellant and Respondent and further
constituted a waiver of the condition that a charter agency agreement be executed between
the parties. Furthermore, the execution of the charter agency agreement was in actuality a
mere formality. Otherwise, enforcement of the condition would constitute an unconscionable
forfeiture after substantial performance by the Appellant.
The offering to Prestige by Respondent of not only the brokerage commissions on the
Chain "C" and Chain " D " flights, the entitlement to which was in dispute but, in addition,
the implementation by Respondent of a system of utilizing flight deposits negotiated by
Appellant to cement the on-going business relationship between Respondent and Prestige
constituted an unlawful hindrance to and interference with the brokerage and agency relationship between Appellant and Respondent and resulted in Appellant receiving no compensation for services rendered in the negotiation and sale of said flights.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court, when faced with the various interpretations
of the findings of fact entered in the instant case, should have made specific findings on the
issues of procuring cause and interference with the brokerage and the agency relationship
existing between Appellant and Respondent and made applicable conclusions of law based
thereon; and that the failure of the court to do so constitutes error.
It is finally submitted that the findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the
payment of commissions on the Chain "C" and Chain " D " flights to Appellant and that the
Respondent can avoid liability to Appellant for such commissions based upon regulations
of the Civil Aeronautics Board are wholly unsupported by any evidence adduced at the trial
and have no basis or foundation in law.
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The Judgment of the District Court should be reversed and judgment in favor of the Appellant and against the Respondent in the sum of $21,645.62 representing the brokerage commission on the Chain "C" flights and $56,755.86 representing the brokerage commission on
the Chain "D" flights should be entered and Appellant should be awarded its costs.

Respectfully submitted,
JWATKISS&, CAMPBELL
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GRflGOllY B. MONSON
Attorneys for Appellant
Suite 400, 315 East Second South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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